Titlebook: Efficient Rent-Seeking; Chronicle of an Inte Alan A. Lockard,Gordon Tullock Book 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001 economi

Entreaty

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-65836-9 here Table 1 from my ‘Efficient Rent-Seeking.’. This shows the equilibrium investment of each individual, different numbers of individuals playing the game (.), and differing values of .. Table 2, also reproduced (ibid.), shows the total investment.

irritation

Intruder

MINT

Michael B. Krause,Winfried Mayer model with an apparent paradox. The market doesn’t clear even with free entry and competition. There have been a number of efforts to deal with this problem (Corcoran, 1984; I commented on it in the same issue, pp. 95–98). (1985) Corcoran and Karels and Higgins, Shughart, and Tollison (1985) are fu

戰(zhàn)勝

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-86140-6nts depending on what is assumed about the number of seekers and the marginal return to a seeker’s investment. If the supply of an input into the rent-seeking process is controlled by a politician who receives payment from seekers for it, the indeterminacy of the process becomes a less serious probl

Customary

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-83652-6z, 1986) has largely involved identical players and been mainly concerned with the extent of under or over dissipation of rents, although Tullock has commented at some length on the ‘intellectual mire’ arising from possible non-existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium when there are increasing return

象形文字

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04185-2 the literature has expanded Tullock’s model in a variety of directions. This article sets out the original problem in the formal framework of a Nash-Cournot game. While only part of Tullock’s original article looks at rent seeking in the Nash-Cournot framework, this framework is a useful way to sum

欲望

仇恨

Fissure