Titlebook: Efficient Rent-Seeking; Chronicle of an Inte Alan A. Lockard,Gordon Tullock Book 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001 economi

有機(jī)體

Free entry and efficient rent seeking,974) and Posner (1975), rents are exactly dissipated at the social level ($1 is spent to capture $1), so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the Harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits.

吊胃口

The design of rent-seeking competitions,em. He supplies it and designs the rent-seeking game to maximize his wealth. The author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician’s wealth in one-input and two-input rent-seeking processes.

Flounder

Rationing and Rent Dissipation in the Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals,s not necessarily improve welfare because total surplus under rationing by waiting depends more on the variance than on the level of time costs and personal valuations. The model is also used to discuss other institutions that involve rent-seeking activities, such as the patent system and import quotas.

使聲音降低

Investments in rent-seeking,sions (see Tullock, 1989). In this article I attempt to move toward explaining lobbying or rent-seeking investments by examining the questions, “How do firms decide how much to spend on campaign contributions?” and “Do these decisions reflect any underlying models of decision making?”

阻礙

Book 2001nter) to work out some examples and gave aseminar on it. For reasons he cannot recall (but probably bad) hetitled his talk `Efficient Rent Seeking‘. As Editor of Public Choicehe was able to publish without a referee. Incidentally, The Journal ofPolitical Economy had turned it down on the grounds tha

Decibel

枕墊

committed

Der Ingenieur und seine Designeran (1983) extended Tullock’s model to a long-run setting, i.e., free entry, and found that under these conditions rents will be dissipated. Tullock (1983) agreed in part, but still maintained that where marginal costs were rapidly falling or rising throughout, Corcoran’s long-run solution does not pertain.

粗俗人

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-04185-2 through the detailed results of Tullock’s model using the Nash-Cournot equilibrium concept.. I will also show the pedagogical value of using this unifying framework to study rent-seeking behavior, and I will present an important result concerning the possibility of overdissipation as stated in Tullock’s original model.

跑過(guò)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-07184-4al rents may accrue to rent-seekers and, under certain conditions, resist dissipation. A number of studies followed Tullock’s 1980 paper (Corcoran, 1984; Corcoran and Karels, 1985; Higgins, Shugart and Tollison, 1985; Tullock, 1984, 1985, and 1987) which explore the dissipation of excess rents under various assumptions.