Titlebook: Efficient Rent-Seeking; Chronicle of an Inte Alan A. Lockard,Gordon Tullock Book 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001 economi

刺耳

Rent-seeking, rent-defending, and rent dissipation,1967) stated intent to identify the total social costs of monopoly. Early studies, which were concerned with the measurement of Tullock costs, simply assumed dissipation would be complete (see Becker, 1968; Kruger, 1974; Posner, 1975; and others). However, Posner (1975) and Fisher (1985) observed th

機(jī)制

后退

A general analysis of rent-seeking games, to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-

賞錢(qián)

synovium

Long-run equilibrium and total expenditures in rent-seeking, aimed at transferring wealth rather than its creation, and the use of resources to obtain this transfer is a loss to society. How important rent-seeking is as a part of the total monopolistic waste hinges on the size of the total expenditures induced by a given level of excess profits.

延期

苦惱

Rent-seeking, rent-defending, and rent dissipation,assumed dissipation would be complete (see Becker, 1968; Kruger, 1974; Posner, 1975; and others). However, Posner (1975) and Fisher (1985) observed the question of dissipation can be answered only for overtly specified game structures.

TOXIN

熒光

潛伏期