Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; First International Burkhard Monien,Ulf-Peter Schroeder Conference proceedings 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidel

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Approximate Strong Equilibrium in Job Scheduling GamesA downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet, as we show in this paper, in some cases, NE does exhibit stability against coalitional deviations, in that the benefits from a joint deviation are bounded. In this sense, NE approximates . (SE) [6]..We provi

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Bertrand Competition in Networksand sell bandwidth at fixed prices subject to capacity constraints; consumers buy bandwidth between their sources and sinks so as to maximize their value from sending traffic minus the prices they pay to edges. We characterize the price of anarchy and price of stability in these “network pricing” ga

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Anecdote

Price Variation in a Bipartite Exchange Networkertices of a bipartite graph and trade is allowed only between neighbors. In this model the graph is generated probabilistically, and each buyer is connected via preferential attachment to . sellers. We show that even though the tail of the degree distribution of the sellers gets heavier as . increa

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