Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; First International Burkhard Monien,Ulf-Peter Schroeder Conference proceedings 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidel

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書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋




書目名稱Algorithmic Game Theory讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

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Fecundity

Conference proceedings 2008, in April/May 2008.?..The 28 revised full papes presented together with 3 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected from 60 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on routing and scheduling, markets, mechanism design, potpourri of games, solution concepts, and cost sharing..

澄清

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-85281-6ften in the form of equilibrium concepts. There are several desiderata one might expect from an equilibrium concept: First and foremost it should be natural and convincing as a prediction of agent behavior. Then it should be . — all games should have it, because otherwise it is an incomplete predict

Rodent

Zusammenfassung der Ergebnisse,uter-simulated monopoly market over fifty time periods. The subjects are provided with a computerized short-run planning tool allowing them to check feasibility of any aspiration level for any set of feedback variables of the respective planning period. Our results fall into two categories, first, r

GLIB

Definitive

Die innerbetriebliche Absatzorganisationsh routing. Each of . players in a network game seeks to send a message with a certain length by choosing one of . parallel links. Each player is restricted to transmit over a certain subset of links and desires to minimize his own transmission-time (latency). We study Nash equilibria of the game, i

cochlea

Absatzpolitische Entscheidungenre Price of Anarchy. In particular, we consider symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks, an interesting class of networks with linearly independent paths, and establish two remarkable properties previously known only for parallel-link games. More precisely, we show that for arbitra

高爾夫

Absatzpolitische Entscheidungentween the cost of an equilibrium (a pure Nash equilibrium, and a strong equilibrium, respectively) to the cost of a social optimum..We consider scheduling on uniformly related machines. Here the atomic players are the jobs, and the delay of a job is the completion time of the machine running it, als

Throttle

Absatzpolitische EntscheidungenA downside of NE is that it is not necessarily stable against deviations by coalitions. Yet, as we show in this paper, in some cases, NE does exhibit stability against coalitional deviations, in that the benefits from a joint deviation are bounded. In this sense, NE approximates . (SE) [6]..We provi