Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; First International Burkhard Monien,Ulf-Peter Schroeder Conference proceedings 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidel

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A Truthful Mechanism for Offline Ad Slot Schedulingell as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism i

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Alternatives to Truthfulness Are Hard to Recognizeions in which truth-telling is always the best response of the players. The Revelation Principle says that one can focus on truthful implementations without loss of generality (if there is no truthful implementation then there is no implementation at all). Green and Laffont [1] showed that, in the s

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Die innerbetriebliche Absatzorganisationocial cost functions. For total latency cost, we show the tight result that the price of anarchy is essentially .. Hence, even for congested networks, when the traffic is linear in the number of players, Nash equilibria approximate the social optimum only by a factor of .. This efficiency loss is ca

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Absatzpolitische Entscheidungen dependence between the number of speeds and the .. For a set of machines of at most . speeds, the . turns out to be exactly .?+?1. The growth of the . for large numbers of related machines is therefore a direct result of the large number of potential speeds. We further consider a well known structu

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Absatzpolitische Entscheidungens. (iii) .: the maximum possible damage ratio of an agent outside the coalition..This framework can be used to study the proximity between different solution concepts, as well as to study the existence of approximate SE in settings that do not possess any such equilibrium. We analyze these measureme

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