Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; Second International Marios Mavronicolas,Vicky G. Papadopoulou Conference proceedings 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin

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Equilibria in Dynamic Selfish Routing,quilibria in dynamic flows, and prove various bounds about their quality, as well as give algorithms on how to compute them. In general, we show that unlike in static flows, Nash equilibria may not exist, and the price of anarchy can be extremely high. If the system obeys FIFO (first-in first-out),

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Nash Dynamics in Constant Player and Bounded Jump Congestion Games,on games [2]..For bounded jump games, where jumps in the delay functions of resources are bounded by ., we show that there exists a game with an exponentially long sequence of .-greedy best response steps that does not converge to an .-approximate equilibrium, for all .?≤?.., where . is the number o

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0302-9743 pects of distributed computing and the internet, congestion, routing and network design and formation games and game-theoretic approaches to networking problems.978-3-642-04644-5978-3-642-04645-2Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349