Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; Second International Marios Mavronicolas,Vicky G. Papadopoulou Conference proceedings 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin

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,A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem,e VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts’ proof is somewhat “magical” and we provide a new “modular” proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.

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978-3-642-04644-5Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009

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Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-642-04645-2Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

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M. Wolfersdorf,AK-Depressionsstationene VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts’ proof is somewhat “magical” and we provide a new “modular” proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.

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Monotonicity in Mechanism Design, buyer is a monotonicity domain if every finite-valued monotone randomized allocation rule defined on it is implementable, in the sense that there exists a randomized truth-telling direct mechanism, which implements this allocation rule. The domain is a weak monotonicity domain if every deterministi

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,A Modular Approach to Roberts’ Theorem,e VCG mechanism termed affine maximizers. Roberts’ proof is somewhat “magical” and we provide a new “modular” proof. We hope that this proof will help in future efforts to extend the theorem to non-full domains such as combinatorial auctions or scheduling.

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Characterizing Incentive Compatibility for Convex Valuations,arbitrary, valuations for outcomes are convex functions in the type, and utilities over outcomes and payments are quasi-linear. Archer and Kleinberg?[1] have proven that in case of valuation functions that are linear in the type monotonicity in combination with a local integrability condition are eq

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Truthful Mechanisms for Selfish Routing and Two-Parameter Agents, the setting where each edge of the network is controlled by a different selfish agent, who incurs costs proportional to the usage of her edge. Moreover, we consider a mechanism design setting with ., which generalizes the well-known setting of one-parameter agents by allowing a fixed cost component