Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; Second International Marios Mavronicolas,Vicky G. Papadopoulou Conference proceedings 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin

SPER

Partition Equilibrium, coalitions, and only deviations by the prescribed coalitions are considered. This is in difference to the classical concept of strong equilibrium according to which any subset of the agents may deviate. In resource selection games, each agent selects a resource from a set of resources, and its payo

思考才皺眉

Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms, that can be accomplished by a manipulable mechanism can also be accomplished with a truthful mechanism. Yet agents often fail to play their optimal manipulations due to computational limitations or various flavors of incompetence and cognitive biases. Thus, manipulable mechanisms in particular shou

Odyssey

Heart-Attack

Sequential Pivotal Mechanisms for Public Project Problems,g variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as ‘redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments’) that generate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting under the simultaneous mechanism. We

Palpitation

抱怨

改變立場(chǎng)

想象

Anticonvulsants

The Balloon Popping Problem Revisited: Lower and Upper Bounds,ation in online auctions, where an auctioneer is selling a collection of identical items to anonymous unit-demand bidders. The auctioneer has the full knowledge of bidders’ private valuations for the items and tries to maximize his profit. Compared with the profit of fixed price schemes, the competi

allergen