Titlebook: ;

約會(huì)

Killing and Oblivion: The Obviation of Sufferingterms pertaining to relevant acts of euthanasia, suicide, and abortion. This intention again confronts, in the Buddhist context, the thesis of post-mortem mental continuity, and with it possible states of post-mortem suffering. The discussion compares the Buddhist view with the ‘consensus view’ of p

myalgia

Representational Persons: Identity as the Object of Killingus, ethnic, political, ideological) identity, and so worthy of attack. It analyses the metaphysical and cognitive differences between this and prior classes of killing, and how these make it as an intentional act prey to ontological illusion and cognitive error. Buddhist arguments account for these

新字

焦慮

債務(wù)

Abduct

Canonical Buddhist Discourse on Killinghist history by such interlocutors as Vasubandhu, Buddhaghosa and Nāgārjuna. The precept prohibiting killing is seen to encode a general principle of the amelioration of suffering, which entails the recognition of moral agency in intention (.), itself determining the moral valence of acts and so the

不透明

反饋

Mahāyāna Exceptionalism and the Lethal Actprecept. Given the central role of . in valorising auspicious lethal acts, a question arises as to its universalizability as a norm of moral epistemology: are all Buddhist agents justified to engage such acts, depending on their degree of compassionate motivation? Ultimately, the causal function of

調(diào)味品

Affect and Cognition: Unwholesome Consciousness, Hatred, Wrong View, and Delusiondent if not proximal causal factor. Deliberation and decision, manifest in reflective thought, entails rational cognition, and aversion is always associated with the hatred-rooted consciousness which itself depends on the specifically cognitive impetus for the . intentionally giving rise to lethal a

Resign