Titlebook: Ronald Reagan and the Space Frontier; John M. Logsdon Book 2019 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 Ronald Reagan.United

mendacity

,“Follow Our Dreams to Distant Stars”,ontier: space.” Announcing his approval of the space station was central to this portion of Reagan’s address. In the run up to the speech, there was a last-minute decision to add an invitation to U.S. international allies to participate in the station program. There was even a brief thought of invit

魔鬼在游行

Together in Orbit: Round One, administration in the 1983–1985 period. Invitations were extended by the White House to a number of countries to fly one of their citizens aboard the shuttle. Perhaps most intriguingly, there were preliminary discussions with the People’s Republic of China about flying a Chinese-developed experimen

偉大

Space Commercialization,ould just as well, if not better, be private sector responsibilities. That perspective had been reflected in the July 1982 statement of National Space Policy, which set as one of its six major space goals expanding “United States private-sector investment and involvement in civil space and space-rel

明確

Commercializing Earth Orbit,e other influences supporting Reagan administration initiatives toward space commercialization during the 1983–1984 period. One was the emergence, just as the Reagan administration arrived in Washington, of a variety of private sector actors interested in space commercialization. Second, there was a

不容置疑

Space Shuttle Issues: Round Two,on’s space efforts would continue to be a continuing theme in Reagan administration space policy. NASA had to deal with the increasingly evident gap between the promises that had accompanied the shuttle’s approval and its actual performance. It continued to press to increase the shuttle’s flight rat

奴才

Missile

Visual-Acuity

Shuttle Wars,ements of the space community carried over into 1985. The National Security Council had to step in between NASA and the Air Force to mediate their dispute over a backup to the shuttle, and an acceptable compromise was reached early in 1985. In contrast, the antagonism between advocates of commercial

物種起源

,, to the U.S. space program. Reacting to that shock occupied much of the Reagan administration’s space policy attention during the rest of 1986. The . accident also gave Ronald Reagan an unfortunate opportunity to display his best qualities. During the day of the accident and its immediate aftermath,

DENT

Recovering from the Accident,ations and National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) less-than-stellar performance in managing them, it became clear that there was a high degree of self-delusion in the way the shuttle had been perceived. Rather than a vehicle delivering on the promises that NASA had made to Richard