Titlebook: Internet and Network Economics; 8th International Wo Paul W. Goldberg Conference proceedings 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 ap

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Choosing Products in Social Networks the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out of several alternatives, and associate with each such social network a strategic game between the agents. The possibility of not choosing any product results in two special types of (pure) Nash equilibria..We show that such games may have n

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Efficiently Learning from Revealed Preferencewn distribution, and a rational agent buys his most preferred bundle according to some unknown utility function, subject to the given prices and budget constraint. We wish not only to find a utility function which rationalizes a finite set of observations, but to produce a hypothesis valuation funct

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Funding Games: The Truth but Not the Whole Truth and reports a valuation ., which verifiably .-bounds .’s true value for receiving .. items. The pairs . can be thought of as size-value pairs defining a knapsack problem with capacity .. A publicly-known algorithm is used to solve this knapsack problem, deciding which requests to satisfy in order t

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Greedy Selfish Network Creation: (1) they model outcomes found by agents which prefer smooth adaptations over radical strategy-changes, (2) GE are outcomes found by agents which do not have enough computational resources to play optimally. In the model of Fabrikant et al. agents correspond to Internet Service Providers which buy

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