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Titlebook: Internet and Network Economics; 8th International Wo Paul W. Goldberg Conference proceedings 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 ap

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 18:48:51 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
書目名稱Internet and Network Economics
副標(biāo)題8th International Wo
編輯Paul W. Goldberg
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/473/472426/472426.mp4
概述Up to date results.Fast track conference proceedings.State of the art research
叢書名稱Lecture Notes in Computer Science
圖書封面Titlebook: Internet and Network Economics; 8th International Wo Paul W. Goldberg Conference proceedings 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012 ap
描述This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012, held in Liverpool, UK, in December 2012. The 36 revised full papers and 13 revised short papers presented together with the abstracts of 3 papers about work in progress and 3 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 112 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on algorithmic game theory; algorithmic mechanism design; auction algorithms and analysis; computational advertising; computational aspects of equilibria; computational social choice; convergence and learning in games; coalitions, coordination and collective action; economics aspects of security and privacy; economics aspects of distributed and network computing; information and attention economics; network games; price differentiation and price dynamics; social networks.
出版日期Conference proceedings 2012
關(guān)鍵詞approximation algorithm; game theory; network topology; privacy auction; strategic agents; algorithm anal
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6
isbn_softcover978-3-642-35310-9
isbn_ebook978-3-642-35311-6Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349
issn_series 0302-9743
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
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Paul W. GoldbergUp to date results.Fast track conference proceedings.State of the art research
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Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cuttingeach bidder desires a subset of the cake (with a uniform value over this subset), and is allocated some subset. Our characterization proceeds via reducing to a simple one-dimensional version of the problem, and yields, for example, a tight bound on the social welfare achievable.
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Agent Failures in Totally Balanced Games and Convex Gamesubclass of convex games. We follow the reliability extension model, recently proposed in [1] and show that a (approximately) totally balanced (or convex) game remains (approximately) totally balanced (or convex) when independent agent failures are introduced or when the failure probabilities increas
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An Economic Analysis of User-Privacy Options in Ad-Supported Serviceslar, we assume that site operators have some control over the cost that a privacy option imposes on users and ask when it is to their advantage to make such costs low. We consider both the case of a single site and the case of multiple sites that compete both for users who value privacy highly and f
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