Titlebook: Interfirm Networks; Franchising, Coopera Josef Windsperger,Gérard Cliquet,Georg Hendrikse Book 2015 Springer International Publishing Switz

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Complementarity Between Formal and Relational Governance Mechanisms in Inter-organizational Networks as complements for knowledge creation, knowledge integration and communication in explaining relational outcome. The results from 104 suppliers in the Turkish automotive industry support the complement perspective.

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埋葬

The Dynamics of Contractual Design: Determinants of Contract Duration in Franchising Networksasis of a multidisciplinary approach using law, management and economics. Taking into account the traditional explanation of franchise contracts duration in terms of specific investments, this paper focuses on the dynamics of contractual design. The empirical analysis is based on franchise French da

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Using Organizational Capability and Transaction Cost Theory to Explain Multi-unit Franchisingory. According to the transaction cost theory, high franchisees’ transaction-specific investments and high behavioral uncertainty increase the franchisor’s propensity to use MUF and high environmental uncertainty decreases the propensity to use MUF. Based on the organizational capability view, MUF i

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Accommodation

Social Capital and Start-Up Performance: The Role of Customer Capitalelationships with investors, suppliers, administrative boards, and on interfirm networks. However, anecdotal evidence illustrates that social capital . can be most decisive, as obviously, an established customer base instantly generates sales, word-of-mouth, and referrals. Based on longitudinal data

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