Titlebook: Game Theory for Networks; Third International Vikram Krishnamurthy,Qing Zhao,Yonggang Wen Conference proceedings 2012 ICST Institute for C

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史前

Revenue Maximization in Customer-to-Customer Markets,any transaction fee charged by the market owner, there always exists a unique equilibrium in the selling decision stage. Finally, we derive the optimal transaction fee that maximizes the market owner’s revenue. We find that to maximize its revenue under certain circumstances, the market owner may ev

提升

Token-Based Incentive Protocol Design for Online Exchange Systems,we use this structural property to design exchange strategies that maximize the system efficiency. Among all protocols with the same threshold, we find that there is a unique optimal supply of tokens that balances the token distribution in the population and achieves the optimal efficiency. Such tok

FLINT

penance

cyanosis

Risk and Return with Derivatives, we propose to limit each user’s total access probability and solve the problem under a total probability constraint. We characterize the NEPs when user rates are subject to a total transmission probability constraint. We propose a simple best-response algorithm that solves the constrained rate maxi

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天空

,History of Taiwan’s Political Changes,e model and a constant-rate revenue model are considered. The Nash equilibrium is shown to exist for four different combined cases corresponding to the two pricing schemes and the two revenue models, and is unique for three of the cases under certain conditions. It is further shown that both pricing

Herd-Immunity

N. S. Cherniack,E. P. Cherniackany transaction fee charged by the market owner, there always exists a unique equilibrium in the selling decision stage. Finally, we derive the optimal transaction fee that maximizes the market owner’s revenue. We find that to maximize its revenue under certain circumstances, the market owner may ev

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