Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models II; Methods, Morals, and Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Spieltheorie.Wi

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Algebra, Funktionalanalysis und CodierungThis paper has two purposes. The immediate purpose is to point out some difficulties with the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten, and show how they can be dealt with. The other purpose is to describe the theory of semi-algebraic sets and a few of its applications in game theory.

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Steven Peter Dugaro,Konrad PolthierIn this paper we discuss the conceptual foundations of one approach to modelling renegotiation in repeated games. Renegotiation-proof equilibria are viewed as social conventions that players continue to find beneficial after every history. The theory can be understood in terms of stationary stable sets of credible deviations.

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,Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”,Game equilibrium models are descriptions of interactive decision situations by games in extensive or normal form. The analysis of such models is based on the equilibrium point concept, often refined by additional requirements like subgame perfectness. The series consists of four volumes:

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The Algebraic Geometry of Games and the Tracing Procedure,This paper has two purposes. The immediate purpose is to point out some difficulties with the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten, and show how they can be dealt with. The other purpose is to describe the theory of semi-algebraic sets and a few of its applications in game theory.

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A Perspective on Renegotiation in Repeated Games,In this paper we discuss the conceptual foundations of one approach to modelling renegotiation in repeated games. Renegotiation-proof equilibria are viewed as social conventions that players continue to find beneficial after every history. The theory can be understood in terms of stationary stable sets of credible deviations.

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Overview: 978-3-642-08109-5978-3-662-07365-0

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Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidedicts that users of open access common-pool resources will appropriate units from the resource at suboptimal rates near full rent depletion. We present evidence from laboratory experiments designed to investigate the accuracy of the rent dissipation prediction for such environments.

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Abdallah Assi,Margherita Barileocieties, and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. The analysis throughout is strictly noncooperative, in the usual sense that players are expected to abrogate an agreement unless the nature of the agreement provides incentives to comply. A recurrent theme is the importance of timing and