Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models II; Methods, Morals, and Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Spieltheorie.Wi

延展

書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II被引頻次




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II年度引用




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II讀者反饋




書目名稱Game Equilibrium Models II讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

beta-carotene

,Anarchy and Agreement — A Game Theoretic Analysis of Some Aspects of Contractarianism,N of concerned individuals who share a common interest decide whether or not they become members of a group S. Only after the group has been constituted its members may make decisions according to some collective decision rule. The decision of whether or not a rational player should join S depends o

reflection

Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement Without Guards,tors have the same payoffs, monitoring efficiencies, and norms of behavior. Then, we examine how stealing and monitoring rates are affected by changes in parameters including: number of irrigators. cost of monitoring, detection probabilities, relative benefits of stealing, losses felt when stealing

forestry

Interaction between Resource Extraction and Futures Markets: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,he (known) structure of inconsistent prior beliefs about the level of uncertain market demand for the basic commodity. The hedging part is related to (known) levels of stocks of the resource available to the individual producers, and to their degree of risk aversion. The conditions under which each

chemoprevention

有毒

有毒

Computing Resolutions Over Finite ,-Groups,tors have the same payoffs, monitoring efficiencies, and norms of behavior. Then, we examine how stealing and monitoring rates are affected by changes in parameters including: number of irrigators. cost of monitoring, detection probabilities, relative benefits of stealing, losses felt when stealing

半球

半導(dǎo)體

,Introduction to Volume II: “Methods, Morals and Markets”,ocieties, and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. The analysis throughout is strictly noncooperative, in the usual sense that players are expected to abrogate an agreement unless the nature of the agreement provides incentives to comply. A recurrent theme is the importance of timing and

溫順

On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual Discussion,e game over and over allows players to repond to others’ actions and forces each player to visualize the reactions of his opponents. Hence, if a game is repeated an infinite number of times, the threat of retaliation becomes an enforcement mechanism which assures the cooperative behavior of the agen