Titlebook: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games; Essays in Honour of Pierre von Mouche,Federico Quartieri Book 2016 Springer

Canary

Psychogenic

Yassine Bouteraa,Ismail Ben Abdallahreflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantia

fastness

Sundarapandian Vaidyanathan,Chang-Hua LienStud 35:9–17, 1998) and Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (Seoul J Econ 11(3):321–330, 1998) and Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Seoul J Econ 13:471–476, 2000) on oligopoly competition in international fisheries, which are based on the assumptions of homogeneous fish population, homogeneous space and continuous

adumbrate

Przemys?aw Kazienko,Nitesh Chawlats or substitutes (Acemoglu and Jensen, Games Econ Behav 81:27–49, 2013). This paper establishes such comparative statics results for contests improving upon existing results by (i) allowing payoff functions to be discontinuous at the origin, and (ii) allowing for asymmetric rent-seeking contests an

祝賀

Applications of Soft Computing for the Webp-proof Nash equilibrium. Such a refinement of the Nash equilibrium prescribes the same communication possibilities as those required by a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium—in the precise sense of Bernheim et al. (J Econ Theory 42:1–12, 1987)—only among the contenders of the same group and between th

jettison

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-26293-2 players in a group may evaluate the prize of the contest differently. We prove that such an asymmetric public-good contest with a general contest success function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group

NATAL

forager

David B. Cordes,Paul D. Lickissne the games characterized by this structure as Cournotian games and we show that the archetypical Cournot model of oligopolistic competition and other models of economic interest are special instances of these games. We then pass to a brief summary of the contributions collected in this volume that are related to Cournotian?games.

一再遛

P. John Williams,Belinda von MengersenCournot equilibrium. This model predicts a monotonic relationship between the markup of a firm and its output. We present evidence, based on a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms, that this relationship is inverse.