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Titlebook: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games; Essays in Honour of Pierre von Mouche,Federico Quartieri Book 2016 Springer

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 20:05:37 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
書目名稱Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games
副標(biāo)題Essays in Honour of
編輯Pierre von Mouche,Federico Quartieri
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/314/313487/313487.mp4
概述Presents a state-of-the-art collection of studies on oligopoly theory.Covers topics including equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional behavior and w
叢書名稱Springer Series in Game Theory
圖書封面Titlebook: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games; Essays in Honour of  Pierre von Mouche,Federico Quartieri Book 2016 Springer
描述.This state-of-the-art collection of papers on the theory of Cournotian competition focuses on two main subjects: oligopolistic Cournot competition and contests. The contributors present various applications of the?Cournotian Equilibrium Theory, addressing topics such as equilibrium existence and uniqueness, equilibrium structure, dynamic processes, coalitional?behavior and welfare. Special emphasis is placed on the aggregative nature of the?games that are relevant to such theory. This contributed volume was written to celebrate the 80th birthday of Prof. Koji?Okuguchi, a pioneer in oligopoly theory..
出版日期Book 2016
關(guān)鍵詞Oligopoly theory; Game theory; Industrial organisation; Cournot competition; Coalitional behavior; Coalit
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0
isbn_softcover978-3-319-80523-8
isbn_ebook978-3-319-29254-0Series ISSN 1868-517X Series E-ISSN 1868-5188
issn_series 1868-517X
copyrightSpringer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
The information of publication is updating

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Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium in Aggregative Games: An Expository Treatment,lasticity and technology has a convex cost function. Our treatment uses the ‘share function’, which exploits the aggregative structure of the resulting game. In this setting, the best response functions are not monotonic, ruling out the use of techniques previously applied to analyze submodular and
板凳
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On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: The Case of Concave Industry Revenue andwith concave industry revenue and convex costs are refined and conceptualised. For this class of oligopolies also new results concerning the geometric structure of the equilibrium set . are provided. In particular, a subclass is identified for which . is a non-empty polytope on which the aggregator
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Interpreting Markups in Spanish Manufacturing: The Exponential Model,Cournot equilibrium. This model predicts a monotonic relationship between the markup of a firm and its output. We present evidence, based on a sample of Spanish manufacturing firms, that this relationship is inverse.
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Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy,overnment gives the optimal subsidy to both public and private firms in a mixed oligopoly. Unlike the existing literature that has assumed that a uniform subsidy is given to public and private firms, we demonstrate that if the discriminatory subsidy rates are adopted even when there is firm asymmetr
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Evolutionary Oligopoly Models of Commercial Fishing with Heterogeneities,Stud 35:9–17, 1998) and Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (Seoul J Econ 11(3):321–330, 1998) and Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Seoul J Econ 13:471–476, 2000) on oligopoly competition in international fisheries, which are based on the assumptions of homogeneous fish population, homogeneous space and continuous
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