Titlebook: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games; Essays in Honour of Pierre von Mouche,Federico Quartieri Book 2016 Springer

深淵

Detonate

Existence, Uniqueness, and Comparative Statics in Contests,llison RD, Tullock G (eds) Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. Texas A&M Press, College Station, pp?97–112). The paper also studies existence and uniqueness of equilibria extending the results of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (Games Econ Behav 18:135–140, 1997) and Cornes and Hartley (Econ Theory 26:923–946, 2005) to patent races.

雜役

殘廢的火焰

On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests,cess function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group is uniquely determined. We also present some comparative statics in the model.

HACK

esoteric

inculpate

Affirm

沒花的是打擾

Applications of Soft Computing for the Webe two groups. We show how a fictitious game with “most inefficient fictitious contenders” can be constructed to prove the existence of a unique group-proof Nash equilibrium of the original two-group contest game. An example evidences that cautious arguments on the (twice) differentiability of cost functions must be used in such a construction.

judicial