Titlebook: Efficient Rent-Seeking; Chronicle of an Inte Alan A. Lockard,Gordon Tullock Book 2001 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001 economi

捏造

BLINK

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90985-1sions (see Tullock, 1989). In this article I attempt to move toward explaining lobbying or rent-seeking investments by examining the questions, “How do firms decide how much to spend on campaign contributions?” and “Do these decisions reflect any underlying models of decision making?”

Jogging

注意力集中

Der Ingenieur als GmbH-Gesch?ftsführer aimed at transferring wealth rather than its creation, and the use of resources to obtain this transfer is a loss to society. How important rent-seeking is as a part of the total monopolistic waste hinges on the size of the total expenditures induced by a given level of excess profits.

paradigm

易于交談

Gianni Mantero,Piero Ponci,Giuseppe Terragniassumed dissipation would be complete (see Becker, 1968; Kruger, 1974; Posner, 1975; and others). However, Posner (1975) and Fisher (1985) observed the question of dissipation can be answered only for overtly specified game structures.

xanthelasma

Bilanzierung von Abgrenzungsposten,Hillman and Riley (1989); Katz .. (1990); Long and Vousden (1987); Ursprung (1990) and Varian (1989). The purpose of this paper is to extend this theory by introducing the possibility of collective-group rent seeking with voluntary individual decisions regarding their extent of participation in the collective rent-seeking efforts.

有機(jī)體

Free entry and efficient rent seeking,974) and Posner (1975), rents are exactly dissipated at the social level ($1 is spent to capture $1), so that the total welfare loss from such activities is equal to the Harberger triangle plus the rectangle of monopoly profits.

吊胃口

The design of rent-seeking competitions,em. He supplies it and designs the rent-seeking game to maximize his wealth. The author derives expressions for the number of seekers and the marginal return parameter which maximize the politician’s wealth in one-input and two-input rent-seeking processes.

Flounder

Rationing and Rent Dissipation in the Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals,s not necessarily improve welfare because total surplus under rationing by waiting depends more on the variance than on the level of time costs and personal valuations. The model is also used to discuss other institutions that involve rent-seeking activities, such as the patent system and import quotas.