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Titlebook: Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications; Alain Haurie,Georges Zaccour Book 2005 Springer-Verlag US 2005 economics.game theory.management.mo

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樓主: Ingrown-Toenail
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發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 16:15:16 | 只看該作者
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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-73121-4 context the impact of a private label introduction on the players‘ payoffs. If this is beneficial for the retailer to propose his brand to consumers and detrimental to the manufacturer, we wish then to investigate if a cooperative advertising program could help the manufacturer to mitigate the negative impact of the private label.
47#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 16:20:57 | 只看該作者
Dynamical Connectionist Network and Cooperative Games,oalitions of these players and multilinear connectionist Operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. Static and dynamical cooperative games also involve coalitions. Allowing “coalitions to evolve” requires the embedding of the finite set of coalitions in the compact convex subset of “f
48#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-29 23:14:38 | 只看該作者
A Direct Method for Open-Loop Dynamic Games for Affine Control Systems,eitmann (1967), for open-loop dynamic games in Dockner and Leitmann (2001) were given. In these papers each player has its own state which it controls with its own control inputs. That is, there is a state equation for each player. However, many applications involve the players competing for a singl
49#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-30 00:24:20 | 只看該作者
Braess Paradox and Properties of Wardrop Equilibrium in Some Multiservice Networks, way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network) that chooses the paths so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number of decision makers having each its own utility to maximize by routing its own flow. This gives rise to the use of non-cooperative game theory an
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