Titlebook: Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications; Alain Haurie,Georges Zaccour Book 2005 Springer-Verlag US 2005 economics.game theory.management.mo

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書目名稱Dynamic Games: Theory and Applications影響因子(影響力)




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純樸

https://doi.org/10.1007/b105876economics; game theory; management; modeling; paraplusig; science

Morose

OATH

Wege zum Softwarebau von morgen,This note considers production (or market) games with transferable utility. It brings out that, in many cases, explicit core solutions may be defined by shadow prices — and reached via quite natural dynamics.

lacrimal-gland

Production Games and Price Dynamics,This note considers production (or market) games with transferable utility. It brings out that, in many cases, explicit core solutions may be defined by shadow prices — and reached via quite natural dynamics.

lacrimal-gland

Leistungsabgabe und Energielieferung,oalitions of these players and multilinear connectionist Operators acting on the set of actions of each coalition. Static and dynamical cooperative games also involve coalitions. Allowing “coalitions to evolve” requires the embedding of the finite set of coalitions in the compact convex subset of “f

深淵

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72871-9eitmann (1967), for open-loop dynamic games in Dockner and Leitmann (2001) were given. In these papers each player has its own state which it controls with its own control inputs. That is, there is a state equation for each player. However, many applications involve the players competing for a singl

airborne

Wege zum Softwarebau von morgen, way. Instead of a single decision maker (that may represent the network) that chooses the paths so as to maximize a global utility, one considers a number of decision makers having each its own utility to maximize by routing its own flow. This gives rise to the use of non-cooperative game theory an

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