Titlebook: Democracy and Deterrence; Philip Bobbitt Book 1988 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1988 defence.democracy.i

信條

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-30021-3, this continuity caused concern in some observers. In 1949, the Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal, commissioned the Harmon Committee to evaluate US plans for an atomic campaign against the Soviet Union. The Committee estimated that the projected attack on seventy Soviet cities would result in a

條街道往前推

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-30021-3 required the unification of nuclear targeting among the services, the reconciliation of their missions and the coordination of launches, if necessary, to enable a single spasm. This coordination was the purpose of the SIOP, which replaced the various separate plans generated by the services. Target

incarcerate

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-30021-3a modification of Controlled Response. Controlled Response had two elements, city withholding and damage limitation. The new doctrine, Damage Limitation, modified the ‘second strike counterforce option’ of the old doctrine standing alone. It was an attempt to serve the purposes of the city-withholdi

挫敗

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-30021-3ited, calling it ‘Strategic Sufficiency’,. doubtless appreciating its positive contributions to fiscal restraint. Relying on the unchanged substance of the doctrine, he used it as the basis for strategic arms limitation talks, originated by Johnson but uncommenced owing to the Russian invasion of Cz

漸變

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-30021-3 outset of each of those wars that the United States would ultimately intervene in decisive numbers on behalf of England and France. Therefore it was a paramount objective of post-World War 2 diplomacy to commit the United States, unmistakably and unambiguously, to any future European conflict and,

Pamphlet

Zur Bestimmung des strategischen Handelnsthat, despite deployment, the threshold of US nuclear commitment is not reduced) or ‘succeed’ and thereby uncouple the central and extended theatres. The Countervailing Strategy, I argued, would provoke political division between the United States and her allies, threatening the long-term viability

Blood-Clot

Das politische Handeln der Landarbeiterose concepts.. This realization was slow in coming, given the inferior Soviet position relative to US armaments that tended to mask Soviet intentions, a patronizing Western attitude toward Soviet military doctrine,. and the American optimism in foreign affairs that arises from what sometimes appears

尖

蚊子

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-90972-1es. That is, the current strategic context required the President either to refuse to use nuclear weapons on behalf of Europe (or other non-US states) or confine their use . European (or other non-Soviet) theatres. Chapters 9, 10, and 11 explored various compensations for the undesirable politico-st

LAIR

Thomas Rauschenbach,Hans-Uwe Ottoat was not, in the present strategic environment, self-deterred, these new independent nuclear forces would require sophisticated surveillance, command arrangements, and selective, counterforce capability; that such forces would amount to a ‘polar’ rearrangement of the current system with uncertain