Titlebook: Britain and European Resistance, 1940-45; David Stafford Book 1980 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1980 Bri

cognizant

What Can I Do About My Headaches?,viet Union, and between the British and the Americans themselves, were becoming more acute, and in Britain itself the end of the coalition government was in sight. The euphoria of September, when the Joint Intelligence Committee had predicted an early end to the war and when Anglo-American forces ha

AVERT

What Do I Have to Look Forward To?,ce. It was given ambitious tasks with extremely limited resources, and its wartime performance fell short of expectations. But its performance cannot be judged in isolation from the wider context of Britain’s war effort, and much the same conclusion might be reached about the performance of the regu

expository

Militia

小平面

Secret Armies and the Detonator Concept,nd had been the Labour Party spokesman on foreign affairs before the war. He undoubtedly saw his tenure of office at the Ministry of Economic Warfare and his control of SOE (which he dubbed the ‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’) as a stepping stone to his eventual appointment as Foreign Secretary.

污穢

A Lean Year, 1941 was to make it plain that there was a considerable distance between the dream and the reality. SOE was not yet operational, and the slow and difficult process of creating the administrative and logistical framework necessary for carrying out its task was to consume most of its energies. It was

Biofeedback

Survival and Consolidation,ow that strategic planning was more firmly focused on the offensive, and it became clearer than ever that SOE’s work would be subordinated to the general strategic directives of the Chiefs of Staff, its independent existence came under close scrutiny. Attempts were made to restrict the scope of its

來自于

chondromalacia

Invasion, Liberation, and Order,ope, the British war leadership began to define more clearly Britain’s own interests in Europe and what these implied for future relations with Moscow. The lessons of the 1930s and the exhaustion of Britain’s financial power in the course of the war itself indicated that Europe would be more importa

值得尊敬

Epilogue,viet Union, and between the British and the Americans themselves, were becoming more acute, and in Britain itself the end of the coalition government was in sight. The euphoria of September, when the Joint Intelligence Committee had predicted an early end to the war and when Anglo-American forces ha