Titlebook: Britain and European Resistance, 1940-45; David Stafford Book 1980 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1980 Bri

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,Are You Sure I Don’t Have a Brain Tumor?,ecret Intelligence Service (SIS) claimed its own priorities in areas of Europe clearly earmarked for future invasion, and SO E-SIS relations became particularly problematic. These various claims and interests converged to create a major crisis for SOE in the late winter and early spring. This was su

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What Do I Have to Look Forward To?,gle Great Power’ (a traditional British foreign policy objective), and second, ‘the security of our vital sea and air communications in the Mediterranean and elsewhere’. But if the future of Europe was crucial to British interests, and the Soviet Union was to emerge from the war as the predominant p

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What Do I Have to Look Forward To?,OE itself. Neither Bomber Command nor SIS, for example, were sympathetic to SOE, and there are. cases to be made for their occasional deliberate obstruction of SOE activities. On the other hand, not all of SOE’s complaints about shortage of aircraft were justified, as in some cases a lack of operati

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,The Origins of SOE, 1939–1940,us about British expectations of European resistance to Nazism and the potentialities of SOE? This chapter, in describing the origins of SOE, will suggest answers to these questions. To begin with, something needs to be said about the assumptions underlying British strategic thinking on the eve of the Second World War.

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Britain and European Resistance, 1940-45978-1-349-03801-5Series ISSN 2633-5964 Series E-ISSN 2633-5972

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