Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 14th International S Ioannis Caragiannis,Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen Conference proceedings 2021 Springer Nature Sw

軍械庫(kù)

headway

NUL

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-04563-2 this setting Kennedy and Kertz [Ann. Probab. 1991] breaks the 0.745 fraction achievable in general with a dynamic threshold policy. We prove that this large market benefit continue to hold when using fixed price PPMs, and show that the guarantee of 0.632 actually improves to 0.712. We then move to

時(shí)間等

On Tightness of the Tsaknakis-Spirakis Algorithm for Approximate Nash Equilibrium better approximate solutions. However, the new distributed algorithm for approximate Nash equilibrium by Czumaj et al. performs consistently at the same bound of 0.3393. This proves our lower bound instances generated against the TS algorithm can serve as a benchmark in design and analysis of appro

surmount

Prophet Inequality with Competing Agentsgents that give them high guarantees, independent of the strategies taken by others. In particular, for random tie-breaking, every agent can guarantee herself at least . of the highest reward, and at least . of the optimal social welfare. For ranked tie-breaking, the .th ranked agent can guarantee h

Agility

Lower Bounds for the Query Complexity of Equilibria in Lipschitz Gamese of interest is the sum of the individual Lipschitz parameters. Finally, we provide an exponential lower bound on the . query complexity of finding .-approximate . equilibria of .-player, .-action, .-Lipschitz games for strong values of ., motivating the consideration of explicitly randomized algor

謙卑

Gerrymandering on Graphs: Computational Complexity and?Parameterized Algorithms be .-complete even if ., ., and . is either a complete bipartite graph (in fact ., i.e., partitions of size 2 and .) or a complete graph. Moreover, recently we and Bentert et al. [WG 2021], independently, showed that the problem is NP-hard for paths. This means that the search for . algorithms need

設(shè)想

synovial-joint

On (Coalitional) Exchange-Stable Matchingsearch variant of deciding whether a given matching can reach an exchange-stable one after at most .?., where a swap is defined as exchanging the partners of the two agents in an exchange-blocking pair .

注入