Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 14th International S Ioannis Caragiannis,Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen Conference proceedings 2021 Springer Nature Sw

Accord

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-26461-4to the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit .-approximate pure Nash equilibria for certain settings of . and .. They left open, however, the question of how hard it is to find such an equilibrium. In this work, we develop a query-efficient reduction from more general games

Initiative

Der Aufbau des M?rtels und des Betonstributions are two-fold: conceptual and computational. We propose a generalization of the model studied by Ito et al., where the input consists of a graph on . vertices representing the set of voters, a set of . candidates ., a weight function . for each voter . representing the preference of the vo

詩(shī)集

Zur Anwendung der Erkenntnisse,. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract can commit a player to act irrationally in specific subgames, making credible otherwise non-credible threats. This is further complicated by considering the interaction between multiple contracts which can reaso

先鋒派

Der Aufbau des Selbst beim Kindg game is .-hard when . even on bipartite graphs of maximum degree 7. We complement this with partial positive results in the special case where . values are bounded by 2. In particular, we describe an efficient algorithm when a constant number of vertices satisfy . as well as an efficient algorithm

平

Der Aufbau des Selbst beim Kindngestion games, and like these, have exact potential functions that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). We prove that the agent’s cost functions for these games can be hard to compute by giving an example of a game for which the cost function is hard for Valiant’s . class, even in

sterilization

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-7091-3014-8s assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a given . or . instance is called . if it does not admit any ., that is, a subset?. of agents in which everyone prefers the partner of some other agent in?.. The matching is . if it does not admit any ., that is, an exchange-blocking coalitio

Digitalis

有助于

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-04563-2 number of goods, when the preferences are identical and budgets are generic, a 2 approximation of competitive equilibrium (2-.) always exists. By 2-. we mean that every buyer receives a bundle with a value at least half of the value of her most desirable bundle that fits within her budget, and the

我不重要

CUR