Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 11th International S Xiaotie Deng Conference proceedings 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 Agents.Auction.C

Latency

Die Personalstruktur der Praxis, been raised and studied. In particular, is it true that the seller can always extract more revenue from a market where the buyers value the items higher than another market? In this paper we obtain such a revenue monotonicity result in a general setting. Precisely, consider the revenue-maximizing c

aplomb

Die Personalstruktur der Praxis,known ways to circumvent this difficulty is to assume that voters’ preferences satisfy a structural constraint, such as, e.g., being single-peaked. Indeed, under this assumption many impossibility results in social choice disappear. Restricted preference domains also play an important role in comput

斜坡

Die Auszubildende in der Praxis,eous and divisible resource, the cake, among . players who value pieces according to their own measure function. The goal is to assign each player a not necessarily connected part of the cake that the player evaluates at least as much as her proportional share..In this paper, we investigate the prob

嘲弄

Der Arzthaftungsproze? in der Praxismportant question is how the operator of a server should deal with combining energy-efficiency and the particular interests of the users. Consider a cloud server, where clients/agents can submit jobs for processing. The quality of service that each agent perceives is given by a non-decreasing functi

Vo2-Max

Zusammenfassung der Untersuchungsergebnisse, private types are often assumed to be common knowledge, information elicitation considers the situation where the players know the distributions better than the decision maker. To weaken the information assumption in Bayesian auctions, we consider an information structure where the knowledge about

Trabeculoplasty

壯觀的游行

Assistenzarzt in der Inneren Abteilung,g subsets and a set . of winning coalitions . with .. Simple games with . are exactly the weighted voting games. Freixas and Kurz (IJGT, 2014) conjectured that . for every simple game (.,?.). We confirm this conjecture for two complementary cases, namely when all minimal winning coalitions have size

CAMEO

Frank H. Mader,Herbert Wei?gerberuilibria of such games in terms of their unidimensional marginal distributions. We propose a . time algorithm for computing unidimensional marginal distributions of equilibrium strategies and a quadratic time algorithm for computing mixed strategies given the margins. The characterization allows us

Valves

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