Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 11th International S Xiaotie Deng Conference proceedings 2018 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018 Agents.Auction.C

細(xì)微差別

Die Auszubildende in der Praxis,e show that our protocol is asymptotically the fastest possible by giving a matching lower bound. Finally, we turn to irrational demands and solve the proportional cake cutting problem by reducing it to the same problem with integer demands only. All results remain valid in a highly general cake cutting model, which can be of independent interest.

取之不竭

Assistenzarzt in der Inneren Abteilung, every minimal winning coalition has size?2, computing . is .-hard, but polynomial-time solvable if the underlying graph is bipartite. Moreover, we show that for every graphic simple game, deciding if . is polynomial-time solvable for every fixed ..

FEMUR

青石板

Fibrin

compel

defenses

Monocle

粗俗人

On Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions, been raised and studied. In particular, is it true that the seller can always extract more revenue from a market where the buyers value the items higher than another market? In this paper we obtain such a revenue monotonicity result in a general setting. Precisely, consider the revenue-maximizing c

玩笑

Restricted Preference Domains in Social Choice: Two Perspectives,known ways to circumvent this difficulty is to assume that voters’ preferences satisfy a structural constraint, such as, e.g., being single-peaked. Indeed, under this assumption many impossibility results in social choice disappear. Restricted preference domains also play an important role in comput