Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 6th International Sy Berthold V?cking Conference proceedings 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 advertise

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19149-8ively, strictly stable colorings in graphs. We characterize the cases when such colorings exist and when the decision problem is NP-hard. These correspond to finding pure strategy equilibria in the anti-coordination games, whose price of anarchy we also analyze. We further consider the directed case

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Systemtheoretischer Architekturreview,tices. A flow satisfying these requests is said to be at Nash equilibrium if every path which carries a positive amount of flow is a shortest path between its source and sink. The goal of MCND is to find a subgraph . of . such that the flow at Nash equilibrium in . is optimal. While this has been sh

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-01659-2n particular, the fundamental social dilemmas such as the Traveler’s dilemma, the Prisoner’s dilemma, and the Public Goods game demonstrate high rates of deviation from the unique Nash equilibrium, dependent on the game parameters or the environment in which the game is played. These results inspire

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-42132-8in social welfare due to fairness. Previous work has been done on this so-called price of fairness, concerning fair division of cakes and chores with non-connected pieces and of cakes with connected pieces. We provide tight or nearly tight bounds on the price of fairness in situations where each pla

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-80503-5dual preferences. An assignment is called popular if there is no other assignment that is preferred by a majority of the agents. Popular assignments need not exist, but the minimax theorem implies the existence of a popular . assignment. In this paper, we study the compatibility of popularity with o

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Gesichts- und Kieferverletzungen, However, the performance of these games at equilibrium may be very bad. This motivates the adoption of mechanisms for inducing a socially optimal state. Many settings are naturally dynamical and thus we believe it is worth to consider the design of incentive compatible best-response mechanisms (Nis