Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 6th International Sy Berthold V?cking Conference proceedings 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013 advertise

Interdict

蛙鳴聲

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6advertisement auction; influence maximization; nash equilibria; network robustness; weighted voting game

N斯巴達(dá)人

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The Complexity of Fully Proportional Representation for Single-Crossing Electoratesant’s rule and Monroe’s rule. Winner determination for these rules is known to be NP-hard for unrestricted preferences. We show that for single-crossing preferences this problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm for Chamberlin–Courant’s rule, but remains NP-hard for Monroe’s rule. Our algorithm for

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New Results on Equilibria in Strategic Candidacysponding candidacy game, where candidates choose strategically to participate or not, has been studied in very few papers, mainly by Dutta et al. [5,6], who showed that no non-dictatorial voting procedure satisfying unanimity is candidacy-strategyproof, or equivalently, is such that the joint action

Ptosis

Osteons

Atheroma

Condescending

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Load Rebalancing Games in Dynamic Systems with Migration Costscifically, some machines are added or removed. Each job’s cost is the load on the machine it is assigned to; thus, when machines are added, jobs have an incentive to migrate to the new unloaded machines. When machines are removed, the jobs assigned to them must be reassigned. Consequently, other job