Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; 8th International Sy Martin Hoefer Conference proceedings 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015 Social netwo

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The Combinatorial World (of Auctions) According to GARP mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial auctions. In the auction setting, we present an efficient combinatorial algorithm to find a virtual valuation function with the optimal (additive) rationality guarantee. Moreover, we show that there exists such a

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Algorithmic Signaling of Features in Auction Designwer on a web page, has numerous features describing the viewer’s demographics, browsing history, temporal aspects, etc. In these markets, an auctioneer must select a few key features to signal to bidders. These features should be selected such that the bidder with the highest value for the product c

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Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-662-48433-3Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

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Prasanta Pattanaik,Yongsheng Xuints for hospitals are generalized to matroid constraints. By generalizing the algorithms of O’Malley for the hospitals/residents problem with ties and master lists, we give polynomial-time algorithms for deciding whether there exist a super-stable matching and a strongly stable matching in our model, and finding such matchings if they exist.

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Monocular and Binocular Cooperation,ed approximation algorithms. Due to the use of the Ellipsoid method, a direct implementation of the method is unlikely to be efficient in practice. We propose to use the much simpler and usually faster multiplicative weights update method instead. The simplification comes at the cost of slightly weaker approximation and truthfulness guarantees.

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