Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 13th International C Nikhil R. Devanur,Pinyan Lu Conference proceedings 2017 Springer International Publishing

Herpetologist

Design of an Optimal Frequency Reward Program in the Face of Competition,rational economic terms. We assume two kinds of customers: myopic and strategic [.]. Every customer has a prior loyalty bias [.] toward the reward program merchant, a parameter drawn from a known distribution, indicating an additional probability of choosing the reward program merchant over the trad

否認(rèn)

commute

Design of an Optimal Frequency Reward Program in the Face of Competition,rational economic terms. We assume two kinds of customers: myopic and strategic [.]. Every customer has a prior loyalty bias [.] toward the reward program merchant, a parameter drawn from a known distribution, indicating an additional probability of choosing the reward program merchant over the trad

戲法

A Characterization of Undirected Graphs Admitting Optimal Cost Shares,ash equilibrium of an induced cost-sharing game. One of the most intriguing open problems to date is to understand the power of budget-balanced and separable cost sharing protocols in order to induce low-cost Steiner forests..In this work, we focus on . networks and analyze topological properties of

GEST

紅潤(rùn)

Routing Games over Time with FIFO Policy,up in a . queue and may wait: an edge is associated with a capacity, which defines how many agents-per-time-step can pop from the queue’s head and enter the edge, to transit for a fixed delay. We show that the best-response optimization problem is not approximable, and that deciding the existence of

Popcorn

Approximate Efficiency in Matching Markets,ely efficient if there is no alternate lottery in which each agent’s ex-ante expected utility increases by an . factor. A mechanism is .-approximately efficient if every lottery produced in equilibrium is .-approximately efficient. We argue this is the natural extension of approximate efficiency in

GENRE

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佛刊

,Limiting User’s Sybil Attack in Resource Sharing,re than . times of their original share from the market equilibrium solution, by characterizing the worst case under which strategic agent can obtain the maximum utility gain after manipulation. On the other hand, such a bound of . is proved to be tight by constructing a proper instance, for which this bound is reached.