Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 13th International C Nikhil R. Devanur,Pinyan Lu Conference proceedings 2017 Springer International Publishing

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Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling,t three coordination mechanisms from the recent literature as Shapley-value-based cost-sharing protocols, thus providing a unifying justification regarding why these mechanisms induce potential games. More importantly, this connection provides a template for designing novel coordination mechanisms,

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A Dynamics for Advertising on Networks,ng products? Broadly, there are two primary modes of advertising: (.) the equivalent of billboards in the real-world and (search or display) ads online that convert a percentage of the population that sees them, and (.) social campaigns where the goal is to select a set of initial adopters who influ

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,Limiting User’s Sybil Attack in Resource Sharing,terested in the robustness of the market equilibrium mechanism in withstanding such an attack, in terms of the incentive ratio to measure how much one could gain by splitting its identity and reconstructing its communication connections with others. On one hand, weshow that no player can increase mo

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The Asymptotic Behavior of the Price of Anarchy,ation (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy is close to 1 in both light and heavy traffic, thus raising the question: can these observations be justified theoretically? We first show that this is not always the case: the price of anarchy may remain boun

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