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Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 10th International C Tie-Yan Liu,Qi Qi,Yinyu Ye Conference proceedings 2014 Springer International Publishing S

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31#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 21:23:23 | 只看該作者
Biobjective Online Bipartite Matchingces even though they have an edge available..As our main result, we introduce an algorithm which randomly discards some edges of the graph in a particular manner – thus enabling the necessary skipping of vertices – and simultaneously runs the color-oblivious algorithm .. We prove that this algorithm
32#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 02:51:30 | 只看該作者
Revenue Maximizing Envy-Free Fixed-Price Auctions with Budgetsm that returns an (1???.)-approximation of the revenue obtained by any envy-free fixed-price mechanism for any .?>?0 and runs in polynomial time in the number of bidders . and 1/ . even for exponential supply of goods .. Next, we consider the case of budgeted bidders with matching-type preferences o
33#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 07:51:31 | 只看該作者
Argyrios Deligkas,John Fearnley,Rahul Savani,Paul Spirakis
34#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 09:44:20 | 只看該作者
Smriti Bhagat,Anthony Kim,S. Muthukrishnan,Udi Weinsberg
35#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 14:39:11 | 只看該作者
36#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 21:51:33 | 只看該作者
37#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 23:17:46 | 只看該作者
Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria-increasing utility functions..We show that the value of the potential function Φ(.) of any outcome . of a congestion game approximates the optimum potential value Φ(..) by a factor . which only depends on the set of cost/utility functions ., and an additive term which is bounded by the sum of the t
38#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 05:20:19 | 只看該作者
Limiting Price Discrimination when Selling Products with Positive Network Externalities the item. The goal of the seller is to maximize his revenue. Previous work on this problem [7] studies the case where clients are offered the item in sequence and have to pay personalized prices. This is highly infeasible in large scale networks such as the Facebook graph: (1)?Offering items to the
39#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 08:25:01 | 只看該作者
40#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 14:30:55 | 只看該作者
Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Gamesy (PoA). First, we prove that among all cost-sharing methods that guarantee the existence of pure Nash equilibria, the Shapley value minimizes the worst-case PoA. Second, if the guaranteed existence condition is dropped, then the proportional cost-sharing method minimizes the worst-case PoA over all
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