Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 10th International C Tie-Yan Liu,Qi Qi,Yinyu Ye Conference proceedings 2014 Springer International Publishing S

elucidate

Truthful Multi-unit Procurements with Budgetsumber of units from each seller, values different combinations of the items differently, and has a budget for his total payment. For a special class of procurement games, the . problem, we show that no universally truthful budget-feasible mechanism can approximate the optimal value of the buyer with

CLASP

螢火蟲

sphincter

A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selectionndependently by Holzman and Moulin?[5] and Alon et al. [1]. Fischer and Klimm?[4] showed that the permutation mechanism is impartial and .-optimal, that is, it selects an agent who gains, in expectation, at least half the number of votes of the most popular agent. Furthermore, they showed the mechan

用肘

Value-Based Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Designand agents are unit demand. In a departure from previous literature, we assume agents have . externalities, meaning that their valuation depends not only on their own signal, but also on the signals of other agents in their neighborhood who win the item. We give a complete characterization of ex-pos

Aggrandize

Redundant

Truthful Approximations to Range Votingas a non-truthful mechanism for exact social welfare maximization in this setting. With . being the number of alternatives, we exhibit a randomized truthful-in-expectation ordinal mechanism with approximation ratio Ω(..). On the other hand, we show that for sufficiently many agents, the approximatio

不要嚴(yán)酷

笨重

PTAS for Minimax Approval Votingg the committee of fixed size k, minimizing the maximal Hamming distance from a vote. In this paper we give a PTAS for this problem and hence resolve the open question raised by Carragianis et al. [AAAI’10]. The result is obtained by adapting the techniques developed by Li et al. [JACM’02] originall

幻影