Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 17th International C Michal Feldman,Hu Fu,Inbal Talgam-Cohen Conference proceedings 2022 Springer Nature Switze

聲明

On Symmetries in?Multi-dimensional Mechanism Designantee from worst-case to Bayesian settings, which circumvents strong impossibility results from these works, and then study this guarantee through the lens of symmetries, as any item-symmetric auction is also fair (by this definition). Observe that in this domain, bundling all items together corresp

angiography

Conjuction

Welfare-Preserving ,-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss transformation runs a . and a . iteratively to make the mechanism Bayesian incentive compatible. We also analyze .-expected ex-post IC (.-EEIC) mechanisms?[.]. We provide a welfare-preserving transformation in this setting with the same revenue loss guarantee for uniform type distributions and give

Cognizance

良心

兵團(tuán)

Eviction

Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness that all of its pure Nash equilibria induce allocations that are . with respect to the underlying true values, while for the algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden we show that the corresponding allocations not only are . but also satisfy ., something that is not true for this algorithm in the non-stra

噴出

Towards a?Characterization of?Worst Case Equilibria in?the?Discriminatory Price Auctiondular valuations. We further present an improved upper bound of 4/3 for the special case where there exists a “high” demand bidder. Finally, we also study Bayes-Nash equilibria, and exhibit a separation result that had been elusive so far. Namely, already with two bidders, the Price of Anarchy for B

貨物

Towards a?Characterization of?Worst Case Equilibria in?the?Discriminatory Price Auctiondular valuations. We further present an improved upper bound of 4/3 for the special case where there exists a “high” demand bidder. Finally, we also study Bayes-Nash equilibria, and exhibit a separation result that had been elusive so far. Namely, already with two bidders, the Price of Anarchy for B

組成

Improved Analysis of?RANKING for?Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching in?the?Random Order Modelomputationally an upper bound on our approach of 0.6688; any further progress beyond this bound will require either further weakening in the assumptions of . or a stronger analysis than that of Huang et al.