Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 17th International C Michal Feldman,Hu Fu,Inbal Talgam-Cohen Conference proceedings 2022 Springer Nature Switze

莊嚴(yán)

The Core of?Housing Markets from?an?Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing Up?Your Home?ket admits an allocation where . receives either ., or a house that she prefers to .; moreover, such an allocation can be found efficiently. We further show an analogous result in the . setting by proving that stable matchings in a one-sided market also respect improvement.

會議

古老

雕鏤

Formal Barriers to?Simple Algorithms for?the?Matroid Secretary Problemgorithms cannot resolve the matroid secretary conjecture. We initiate the study of impossibility results for frameworks to resolve this conjecture. We establish impossibility results for a natural class of greedy algorithms and for randomized partition algorithms, both of which contain known algorithms that resolve special cases.

不愛防注射

Strategyproof Facility Location in?Perturbation Stable Instancesistic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms suffer an unbounded approximation ratio in .-stable instances. Moreover, we prove that allocating the facility to a random agent of each optimal cluster is strategyproof and 2-approximate in 5-stable instances.

Traumatic-Grief

Strategyproof Facility Location in?Perturbation Stable Instancesistic anonymous strategyproof mechanisms suffer an unbounded approximation ratio in .-stable instances. Moreover, we prove that allocating the facility to a random agent of each optimal cluster is strategyproof and 2-approximate in 5-stable instances.

令人心醉

BOOM

Contract Design for?Afforestation Programs contract can involve time-varying payments that are typically higher in earlier periods and may end early. We surveyed farmers partnered with an afforestation program in Uganda to collect data on tree maintenance costs and we derive the optimal payment contract for the reported costs.

myopia

On the?Benefits of?Being Constrained When Receiving Signalsmore constrained receiver will always obtain (weakly) higher utility than a less constrained one. Unfortunately, without additional assumptions, the result does not hold when there are more than two states in the world, which we show with an explicit example.

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