Titlebook: Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate; Proving Their (In)Vu Dan S. Felsenthal,Hannu Nurmi Book 2018 The Author(s) 2018 Voting.V

災(zāi)禍

,The (In)Vulnerability of the Ranked Condorcet–Consistent Procedures to Various Paradoxes,Young’s procedures) to 13 voting paradoxes. The invulnerabilities are explained and the vulnerabilities demonstrated through illustrative profiles where the paradoxes occur under the procedures examined.

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Summary,)vulnerability to various voting paradoxes. No procedure is invulnerable to all the analyzed voting paradoxes, but there are differences in the variety of paradoxes that various procedures are vulnerable to. It turns out that for those emphasizing that a Condorcet Winner ought to be elected when s/h

blister

abysmal

evasive

防止

細(xì)胞膜

Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate978-3-319-74033-1Series ISSN 2191-5504 Series E-ISSN 2191-5512

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SpringerBriefs in Economicshttp://image.papertrans.cn/v/image/985087.jpg

少量

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1Voting; Voting procedure; Voting paradox; Elections; Vulnerability to voting paradox; Non-ranked voting p

ACME

Dan S. Felsenthal,Hannu NurmiProvides an overview of 18 voting procedures for elections resulting in the choice of a single winner.Describes the most common voting paradoxes.Illustrates by way of examples the vulnerability of som