Titlebook: Voting Power and Procedures; Essays in Honour of Rudolf Fara,Dennis Leech,Maurice Salles Book 2014 Springer International Publishing Switz

侵略

On the Measurement of Success and Satisfactionmonstrate that both notions are conceptually distinct, and discuss their relationship and measurement. We show that . contains . as one component, and that both coincide under the canonical set-up of a simultaneous decision-making mechanism as it is predominant in the voting power literature. Howeve

Axon895

Voting Power Techniques: What Do They Measure?. The techniques used to calculate voting power have names like the Shapley-Shubik index, and the Banzhaf measure. They are invaluable when used to design democratically fair voting games..In this paper we examine these different techniques, with the specific aim of trying to understand what they ar

Infect

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A Probabilistic Re-View on Felsenthal and Machover’s “The Measurement of Voting Power”tems. Their presentation strikes a balance between the game-theoretic and the probabilistic approaches to the subject. The present paper holds that the probabilistic view may be profitably extended even further, in providing helpful language as well as motivating new results.

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Square Root Voting System, Optimal Threshold and π Union (EU), is investigated. Various arguments in favor of the square root voting system, where the voting weights of member states are proportional to the square root of their population are discussed and a link between this solution and the random walk in the one-dimensional lattice is establishe

Mere僅僅

The Fate of the Square Root Law for Correlated Votingng system is the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Under the assumption of independence of the voters, the square root law gives a fair distribution of power (based on the Penrose–Banzhaf power index) and a fair distribution of weights (based on the concept of the majority deficit), both g

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Multiple

Voting Power When One Vote Counts in Two Ways, with Application to Two Variants of the U.S. Electoniversal practice since the 1830s) separate state popular votes are aggregated by adding up state electoral votes awarded, on a winner-take-all basis, to the plurality winner in each state. Each state has electoral votes equal in number to its total representation in Congress and since 1964 the Dist

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Aspects of Power Overlooked by Power Indices various actors. That these indices sometimes seem to be at odds with the intuitive distribution of real power in voting bodies follows naturally from their a priori nature. Indices based on actor preferences address this by equating an actor’s voting power with the proximity of voting outcomes to h

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Banzhaf–Coleman and Shapley–Shubik Indices in Games with a Coalition Structure: A Special Case Studysible approaches in both cases: we calculate voters’ power in a composite game or we apply the modification of original indices proposed by Owen for games with a priori unions. The behavior of both indices is compared basing on the voting game with 100 voters and different coalition structures. We a