Titlebook: Understanding Strategic Interaction; Essays in Honor of R Wulf Albers,Werner Güth,Eric Damme Book 1997 Springer-Verlag Berlin — Heidelberg

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Recurring Bullies, Trembling and Learningier groups. Starting with uncertainty about the distribution of types in the population, late groups may learn to play a correct Bayesian equilibrium, as if they know the type distribution..This paper concentrates on Selten’s Chain Store game and the Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, Wilson phenomenon, where

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Book 1997h interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining social int

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nalyse such interaction normatively, using numerous different methods. The rationalistic approach assumes perfect rationality whereas behavioral theories take into account cognitive limitations of human decision makers. In the animal kingdom one usually refers to evolutionary forces when explaining

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Reinhard Selten Meets the Classicss in anarchy, and Thomas Hobbes’ efforts to explain all aspects of social order in terms of individually rational choice. Relating simple game models to excerpts from classical texts sheds modem game theoretic light on the works of the classics and some classical light on game theory.

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Games of Incomplete Information: The Inconsistent Caseion ., as generated from the various beliefs, can be thought as being derived from a .. In this case Harsanyi constructs a game G of perfect recall and in extensive form, whose players represent the various types of the players in .. They are called . and . itself is called ..