Titlebook: Understanding Representation in the Cognitive Sciences; Does Representation Alexander Riegler,Markus Peschl,Astrid Stein Book 1999 Springe

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Allowance

Book 1999aches, psychology, semiotics, evolutionary ter and more integrative understanding of their biology, social psychology etc. , to foster a new thoughts and ideas. understanding of representation. The subjective experience of an outside world This book has a truly interdisciplinary character. It seems

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Does Representation Need Reality?ween the classical view of referential representation, and the alternative concept of system-relative representation. The latter refers to situated cognitive processes whose dynamics are merely modulated by their environment rather than being instructed and determined by it.

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Overview of Contributionstation are followed by contributions that focus on computational approaches, especially on how meaning can be simulated in artificial devices, and how meaning can be grounded. Solutions are offered on various levels, among them symbol grounding and system-theoretical considerations to representation

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The Connectionist Route to Embodiment and Dynamicism a distinction of several types or uses of representation in cognitive science. I demonstrate how connectionism helps in abandoning one of these types—the notion that representation is a mirror of an objectively existent world—while maintaining the important other two types—causal correlates of phys

薄膜

The Ontological Status of Representationsn, or whether a certain representation is . than another one, depends solely on the (level of) description of the phenomenon under scrutiny. It is shown how “representation”, being a semantic notion, can be defined in terms of the notion “meaning”. For cognitive science, in particular, it follows th

緩解

Empirical and Metaphysical Anti-Representationalismhat cognition is not representational, often without giving explicit consideration to what . this means. The point of this essay is to try to make some sense of claims that cognitive science can do without representations by proposing a taxonomy for them. In what follows, I will make a distinction b

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Representation in Cognitive Neuroscienceion of representational processes as those that establish an isomorphic relation between two structures, I claim that . processes generate only a . correspondence (between stimuli properties and brain states) and therefore should not be properly conceived as representational. On the other hand, . pr

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