Titlebook: Ukraine Between the EU and Russia: The Integration Challenge; Rilka Dragneva,Kataryna Wolczuk Book 2015 Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczu

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Ukraine and Europe: Integration by Demand, for integration and the EU’s limited receptivity to those demands. We explore the circumstances which compelled the EU to shift relations from cooperation to integration, and its ultimate offer in the shape of the Association Agreement, the content of which is analysed in the final section.

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The EU and the Yanukovych Regime: The Widening Gap,ying political conditionality to the signing of the Association Agreement. However, this conditionality was so centred on the single issue of selective justice (the Tymoshenko case) that it neglected to take into account the domestic context and Russia’s ability to exploit the opportunities that this conditionality presented.

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The Military Backlash,ing Ukrainian statehood. Russia’s actions also sought to expose the limits of the EU’s readiness to support Ukraine during this period, and in particular its search for a political settlement in the face of Russia’s armed suasion. This chapter will explore the contours of these events with a view to understanding Russia’s strategy.

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Ukraine and Russia: Managing Interdependence,ine’s commitments to Russia’s regional plans and Russia’s approach in pursuing them. We demonstrate that Ukraine adopted and consistently implemented a strategy of highly limited participation in post-Soviet regional integration, perceiving it as Russia’s means of asserting its regional hegemony at

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Ukraine and Europe: Integration by Demand, we examine Ukraine’s motives behind making EU membership a formal foreign policy objective. We then draw attention to the gap between Ukraine’s European declarations and domestic deeds by reference to the key features of the domestic political regime in Ukraine. Finally, we analyse Ukraine’s demand

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The EU and the Yanukovych Regime: The Widening Gap,lected in 2010, President Yanukovych moved closer towards concluding the new agreement with the EU. Yet, it was under Yanukovych’s rule that the gap between domestic developments and pro-European declarations was the widest. The EU reacted to the authoritarian tendencies of Yanukovych’s rule by appl

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,Russia’s New Integration Offer: Forcing Ukraine’s Hand,ing the Agreement with the EU. We examine Ukraine’s response to this offer and the search for a formula to satisfy Russia while stopping short of membership of the Eurasian regime. We show how, ultimately, this search for a ‘third way’ — more than cooperation but less than integration — over 2011–13

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Yanukovych, the EU and Russia: The End of Balancing,te its concerted campaign. Nonetheless, the economic mismanagement of Yanukovych’s regime — on top of 20 years of neglected reform and institutionalised rent-seeking — had left Ukraine bankrupt and hence extremely susceptible to external pressure. This chapter explains Yanukovych’s ‘twisting and tur