Titlebook: US Financial Regulation and the Level Playing Field; Helen A. Garten Book 2001 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limi

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Deposit Insurance and the Politics of Regulatory Subsidy,ertain other depository institutions) up to a maximum of $100 000 (since 1980), may appear to be a straightforward consumer protection scheme, designed for the benefit of small depositors who otherwise would suffer financial loss in the event of bank failure. And certainly deposit insurance is not u

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Regulatory Conflict and Competitive Equality,uld predict, generating beneficial innovation and deregulation. Most players in US financial markets probably would concur that the deregulatory process that culminated in the approval of the Citicorp/Travelers combination represented regulatory competition at its best. Nevertheless, tributes to reg

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The Level Playing Field and Rules of Fair Play,urities affiliate advised Mr Brown that the US government securities that he owned were ‘a(chǎn)ll wrong’ and reinvested his account in Viennese, German, Greek, Peruvian, Chilean, Rhenish, Hungarian and Irish governmental obligations as well as bonds issued by private US corporations. Mr Brown was also pe

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Failure on a Level Playing Field,but several others loom as large. Among them are the failure of Penn Square Bank, the first $100 million bank to be liquidated, in 1982, the bailout of Continental Illinois, at the time the nation’s seventh largest bank, in 1984 and the rescue of Long-Term Capital Management, a hedge fund, in 1998.

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Let the Market Pick the Winners,t card companies, launched a joint trial to test the viability of ‘smart cards’ in US retail consumer markets. The two banks issued reloadable stored value cards to approximately 100 000 people living on Manhattan’s Upper West Side. The cards functioned as electronic purses: customers could transfer

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Book 2001US regulation derives from its success in promoting four principles of competitive fairness that US players demand from financial markets. The peculiar US notion of a ‘level playing field‘ provides a novel approach to understanding the evolution of US regulation, including recent reform, and to pred

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Regulatory Conflict and Competitive Equality, not necessarily result in equal regulatory treatment of competing financial players. To the contrary, in the short run, and perhaps even in the long run, regulatory competition may exacerbate inequities in the regulatory scheme.