| 書目名稱 | Truth and Its Nature (if Any) | | 編輯 | Jaroslav Peregrin | | 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/931/930641/930641.mp4 | | 叢書名稱 | Synthese Library | | 圖書封面 |  | | 描述 | The question how to turn the principles implicitly governing the concept of truth into an explicit definition (or explication) of the concept hence coalesced with the question how to get a finite grip on the infinity of T-sentences. Tarski‘s famous and ingenious move was to introduce a new concept, satisfaction, which could be, on the one hand, recursively defined, and which, on the other hand, straightforwardly yielded an explication of truth. A surprising ‘by-product‘ of Tarski‘s effort to bring truth under control was the breathtaking finding that truth is in a precisely defined sense ineffable, that no non- trivial language can contain a truth-predicate which would be adequate for the very 4 language . This implied that truth (and consequently semantic concepts to which truth appeared to be reducible) proved itself to be strangely ‘language-dependent‘: we can have a concept of truth-in-L for any language L, but we cannot have a concept of truth applicable to every language. In a sense, this means, as Quine (1969, p. 68) put it, that truth belongs to "transcendental metaphysics", and Tarski‘s ‘scientific‘ investigations seem to lead us back towards a surprising proximity of some | | 出版日期 | Book 1999 | | 關鍵詞 | Donald Davidson; Gottlob Frege; Rudolf Carnap; idea; knowledge; reason; semantic | | 版次 | 1 | | doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9233-8 | | isbn_softcover | 978-90-481-5280-3 | | isbn_ebook | 978-94-015-9233-8Series ISSN 0166-6991 Series E-ISSN 2542-8292 | | issn_series | 0166-6991 | | copyright | Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1999 |
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