| 書(shū)目名稱(chēng) | The Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Regime after the Covid-19 Pandemic |
| 副標(biāo)題 | Dealing with the Sci |
| 編輯 | Malcolm Dando |
| 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/907/906020/906020.mp4 |
| 概述 | Explores the risk of the weaponization of biochemistry in light of the Covid-19 pandemic.Provides an essential and timely reference point for the disarmament policy community.Written by a world-acknow |
| 圖書(shū)封面 |  |
| 描述 | .This book offers an?analysis of how the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) regime has responded in the immediate aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Coronavirus has highlighted the need to better protect modern societies from natural, accidental and deliberate disease affecting humans, animals and plants. Within that context preventing the deliberate hostile use of biological and chemical agents will be of increasing importance. Dando asks to what extent there has been a significant strengthening to the CBW non-proliferation regime in the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic using an analysis focused on two proposals to strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which aim to constrain advances in science and technology developments that could be misused. On this basis he concludes that it would be hard to argue that to date there has been a significant strengthening of the CBW regime.. |
| 出版日期 | Book 2023 |
| 關(guān)鍵詞 | Covid-19; Coronavirus; Pandemic; Chemical and biological weapons; Biological Security; Neuroweapons; Chemi |
| 版次 | 1 |
| doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19108-4 |
| isbn_ebook | 978-3-031-19108-4 |
| copyright | The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 |
|Archiver|手機(jī)版|小黑屋|
派博傳思國(guó)際
( 京公網(wǎng)安備110108008328)
GMT+8, 2025-10-7 09:17
發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 16:39:45
