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Titlebook: Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria; Eric Damme Book 19871st edition Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987 economics.equilibrium.

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書目名稱Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
編輯Eric Damme
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/876/875308/875308.mp4
圖書封面Titlebook: Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria;  Eric Damme Book 19871st edition Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987 economics.equilibrium.
描述The last decade has seen a steady increase in the application of concepts from noncooperative game theory to such diverse fields as economics, political science, law, operations research, biology and social psychology. As a byproduct of this increased activity, there has been a growing awareness of the fact that the basic noncooperative solution concept, that of Nash equilibrium, suffers from severe drawbacks. The two main shortcomings of this concept are the following: (i) In extensive form games, a Nash strategy may prescribe off the equilibrium path behavior that is manifestly irrational. (Specifically, Nash equilibria may involve incredible threats), (ii) Nash equilibria need not be robust with respect to small perturbations in the data of the game. Confronted with the growing evidence to the detriment of the Nash concept, game theorists were prompted to search for more refined equilibrium notions with better properties and they have come up with a wide array of alternative solution concepts. This book surveys the most important refinements that have been introduced. Its objectives are fourfold (i) to illustrate desirable properties as well as drawbacks of the various equilibri
出版日期Book 19871st edition
關(guān)鍵詞economics; equilibrium; game theory; incomplete information; population dynamics; strategy
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-96978-2
isbn_ebook978-3-642-96978-2
copyrightSpringer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1987
The information of publication is updating

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Games in Normal Form,le against small perturbations in the data of the game. In this chapter, we will consider various refinements of the Nash concept for this class of games, all of which require an equilibrium to satisfy some particular robustness condition.
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Control Costs, game, incurs costs depending on how well he chooses to control his actions. Such a game models the idea that a player can reduce the probability of making mistakes, but that he can only do so by being extra prudent, hence, by spending an extra effort, which involves some costs. The goal of the chap
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Incomplete Information, with incomplete information, the class of disturbed games, is studied. A disturbed game is a normal form game in which each player, although knowing his own payoff function exactly, has only imprecise information about the payoff functions of his opponents. We study such games since we feel that it
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Evolutionary Game Theory,ng the intended fields of application. Since the theory is based on an idealized picture of human rationality, it is by no means obvious that it can be applied to situations in which the players cannot be attributed any intellectual capabilities. However, in their seminal paper ‘The logic of animal
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