Titlebook: Spatial Interaction Models; Facility Location Us Lina Mallozzi,Egidio D‘Amato,Panos M. Pardalos Book 2017 Springer International Publishing

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書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models影響因子(影響力)




書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度




書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models被引頻次




書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models年度引用




書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models年度引用學(xué)科排名




書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models讀者反饋




書目名稱Spatial Interaction Models讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

預(yù)知

Spatial Interaction Models978-3-319-52654-6Series ISSN 1931-6828 Series E-ISSN 1931-6836

民間傳說

饒舌的人

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-52654-6Facility Location Theory; Game Theory; facilities location management; Discrete location and assignment

Gobble

A Game Theoretic Approach to an Emergency Units Location Problem,In this paper we consider the problem of locating emergency units in a given area, defining a suitable class of TU-games. The Shapley value results to be a very good solution for this class of games. A simple formula for computing the Shapley value is derived. A real-world example and some comments conclude.

助記

upstart

Lina Mallozzi,Egidio D‘Amato,Panos M. PardalosExamines facility location theory through game theoretical tools.Focuses on situations where the location decision is faced by several decision makers.Surveys models and methods regarding facility loc

Detonate

Sequential Entry in Hotelling Model with Location Costs: A Three-Firm Case,game, and that the game is played into two steps. After the first step, in which the classical duopoly game is played, we suppose that in a second step a third firm enters the market and that the incumbents are allowed to react to this entry. In both steps firms have to face a cost for location, for which we consider two different cases.

larder

Book 2017cs, engineering, and physics. Mathematicians, engineers, economists and computer scientists working in theory, applications and computational aspects of facility location problems using game theory will find this book useful..

HILAR

Leader-Follower Models in Facility Location,o attract much demand; (iii) competitive location of two facilities applying the gravity (Huff) rule; (iv) competitive location of multiple facilities using the cover-based rule; and (v)locating facilities on the nodes of a network to cover as much demand as possible following a removal of a link by a follower.