Titlebook: Social Choice Mechanisms; Vladimir I. Danilov,Alexander I. Sotskov Book 2002 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002 Equilibrium Concept.Ga

為現(xiàn)場

indubitable

Cores and Stable Blockings,ty of a given blocking. In particular, convexity and almost-additivity turn out to be necessary for the stability of maximal blockings. In Section 4.6, we develop a veto-procedure in order to find elements in the core. The procedure yields single-element outcomes for any maximal convex blocking.

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Gastric

Overstate

Book 2002ory of social choice and mechanism design. We examine the premises of this theory, the axiomatic approach, and the mechanism design approach. The main questions are what is collective interest, how is it related to individuals‘ interests, how should one design social interactions, laws, and in- stit

Memorial

FUME

OASIS

Strategy-proof Mechanisms,sible preference profile. Based on the revelation principle, we construct, for every strategy-proof mechanism, an equivalent direct non-manipulable mechanism. The key characteristic of such a mechanism is the agent’s effective region in the set of outcomes. From this point of view, we study the stru

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Cores and Stable Blockings,tcomes depends only on the stability of the blocking generated by a given mechanism. We investigate here stable blocking relations. We begin with a few examples and give some useful instruments (Section 4.1). In Sections 4.2–4.4 we discuss three classes of stable blockings: additive blockings, almos

異常

Strongly Consistent Mechanisms,vestigate in more detail a strongly consistent mechanism with tokens (Section 5.2). Section 5.3 addresses the issue somewhat more theoretically. In particular, we show that for any maximal blocking ., there exists a mechanism whose set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with the core of the blocking